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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1955 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL H. SANDERS*

Judicial review of administrative agency action, with emphasis upon
the limited nature of such review, has again been of major importance
in Tennessee Administrative Law during the survey period, This is
shown to be true not only in the number of decisions but also in the
frequent utilization (and apparent broadening) of the doctrine of
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission1
in according finality to administrative action. In addition to holdings
on various aspects of judicial review, the Tennessee appellate courts
contributed important decisions during the survey period dealing with
delegation of legislative power and the application of the doctrine of
res judicata to administrative action.
Delegationof Legislative Power
By definition, an administrative agency is an organ of government,
other than a regular court or legislature, which can adjudicate the
rights of private parties or affect such rights by making rules having
the force and effect of law.2 Possession of the quasi-judicial or quasilegislative function, or both, thus distinguishes the administrative
agency from the purely executive. Nevertheless, when rule-making
power is conferred by the legislature it is generally assumed that it
must avoid an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
agency. There is no uniformity of approach but probably the usual
rule recognizes that vesting a subordinate law-making function in the
agency is permissible if the legislature has declared basic policy and
furnished sufficiently precise standards. 3
The decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Department of
Public Welfare v. NationalHelp "U" Association4 may be taken to rely
in part on this principle but to place much greater emphasis on the
conclusion that the power delegated was "ministerial" or "administrative" in character rather than "purely legislative." The case arose on
demurrer to a bill filed under Chapter 228 of the Public Acts of Tennessee for 19535 which authorized the State Department of Public
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953); see discussions in Sanders, Administrative Law-954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VA=. L. REv. 733, 741-45 (1954);
Hunt, ConstitutionalLaw-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV. 763, 781-85

(1954); Lacey, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Tennessee-Scope

of Review, 23 TENN'. L. REV. 349-69 (1954).

2. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1-4 (1951).
3. /ERRML, ADmSTRATIm LAW 48-58 (1954); but compare DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIV LAW c. 2, pp. 86-88 (1951).
4. 270 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1954).

5. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4765.138-52 (Williams Supp. 1954).
940
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Welfare to license and regulate child welfare agencies. Section 4 of
the Act reads in part as follows:
"Section 4. Be it further enacted, That all child welfare agencies, as
defined in Section 1 of this Act shall be licensed annually by the department, said license to be based on standards developed in accordance with
the following six points of excellence:
"(1) The present need for the proposed child welfare agency.
"(2) The good character and intention of the applicant.
"(3) The adequate financing of the organization.
"(4) The capability, training and experience of the workers employed.
"(5) The facilities for and the methods of care provided, and the consideration of the best interest of the child and the welfare of society in
any placements of children to be made.
"(6) The probability of permanence of the child welfare agency.
"The department shall develop and publish standards for license for
each child welfare agency defined in Section 1 of this Act."6
In an opinion by Justice Burnett the Supreme Court affirmed the
decree of the chancellor overruling the demurrer of the National
Help "U" Association to the bill for injunction filed by the Department
of Public Welfare.
The Court reasoned that the power conferred on the department
by the above-quoted section was not purely "legislative" but mere
administrative discretion as an adjunct to law enforcement. "Of
course the Legislature cannot delegate the exercise of its discretion as
to what the law shall be, but it certainly in modern times may confer
a discretion in the administration of the law." 7 Referring to the
"points of excellence" in the statute, the opinion declares: "Such
standards are definite and clear, though they leave the details of
the requisites for the issuance of license to the discretion of the department. These details clearly are ministerial matters and may
properly be delegated." 8 In conclusion the opinion points out that protection is afforded in the Act against arbitrary action by the department through provisions for hearing before the agency and review
by the circuit court of the county where the child-caring or adoptive
agency is located.
The choice of words embodied in Section 4 of the statute virtually
invites an attack upon the delegation of power to the agency for
lack of standards prescribed by the legislature. As the appellant's
brief in the above case declares, the general rule is usually thought to
be that the legislature itself must prescribe the standards or norms. 9
For example, a recent New York decision involved a statute requir6. Id. § 4765.141.
7. 270 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tenn. 1954).
8. Ibid.

9. Id. at 338.
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ing private schools to be "registered under regulations prescribed by
the board of regents." The statute was invalidated, by a divided
court, on the ground of the insufficiency of the statutory standard. 10
Certain differences between the New York case and the Tennessee
decision under discussion with respect to guides or controls over administrative rule-making power are readily apparent. The "six points
of excellence" in Section 4, as well as the definitions in Section 1 of
the 1953 Tennessee Act, would undoubtedly be regarded as providing
clearly apparent legislative standards in most jurisdictions." Of
course the "standards" referred to in the statute which the department is to develop and the "standards" required to avoid an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power embody entirely different concepts. The draftsman of the 1953 Act used a novel term
instead of the applicable legally-defined term in delegating rulemaking power to the agency and then complicated the problem, in this
respect at least, by using a legally defined term in a context where it
would be vulnerable to an attack on a constitutional basis. The
court very properly did not permit this technical defect in drafting
to render the statute invalid on demurrer. This decision, of course,
does not negate the possibility of rules being issued which would
be invalid because ultra vires, that is, not reasonably within the scope
of the power granted as modified by the "points of excellence" set
forth in the statute.'2
The opinion in the instant case does not stress the presence of
adequate standards in the legislation under attack. Major attention
is given instead to the conclusions that the power granted is not
exclusively legislative in character. Individual sentences in the
opinion taken in isolation would seem to suggest a virtual unlimited
authority in the legislature to grant rule-making power to an
administrative agency where the purpose of regulation or other law
enforcement is made clear. 13 It is believed that the opinion has no
such scope. Rather the decision would seem to indicate that the
Tennessee court is concerned primarily with whether or not the
legislature has abdicated the basic law-making function in the particular instance. The opinion recognizes that rather broad powers to
implement a legislative policy may be turned over to an administrative
agency and that whether these are legislative or not (in an invalidating sense) depends upon the subject matter of the particular legislative pronouncement- and the reasonable relation of the power to
the declared legislative purpose. The court's designation of the power
10. Packer Collegiate Institute v. University of State of New York, 298 N.Y.

184, 81 N.E.2d 80 (1948), 49 COL. L. REv. 573 (1949).
11. MMMILL, ADMINSTRAT=E LAW 49-53 (1954).
12. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Producers, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944);
Hunt, ConstitutionalLaw, 7 VANm. L. REv. 733, 734 (1954).
13. 270 S.W.2d 337, 339, 340 (Tenn. 1954).
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granted by Section 4 of the Act to the Department of Public Welfare
as "administrative" might seem more of a conclusion than an explanation. Still it is of practical value in recognizing that in law and fact
we have developed a branch of government that does not fall within
any one of the traditional three branches. Furthermore, the problem
of administrative rule-making is placed in its proper prospective. If
the legislature has performed the basic law-making function and
within reasonable limits left it to an agency to fill in the details this
latter function is not "legislative" in any constitutional sense. What
the reviewing court must do is to determine whether the proper balance between the legislative and administrative has been maintained.
This is probably as helpful and useful an approach as the search
for the "sufficiently precise standard."
JudicialReview
Method: "Common Law" certiorari has been the standard method of
securing judicial review of administrative agency action in Tennessee.14 As the name suggests, specific legislation has not been required
even though it exists. 15 Further the common-law writ has been
thought to be constitutional in its basis. 16 It has, however, been named
specifically as the vehicle for securing such review in many of the
regulatory statutes including those relating to the sale of beer. By
this method Code Section 1191.14 and 1191.47 would appear to permit
virtually any inquiry by the reviewing court as to the legal authority
of an agency to take action. In 1953 the Supreme Court said in Crowe
v. Carter County 17 that certiorari to the circuit courts as provided in
the foregoing section was the exclusive method of review of the
action of beer boards and that the revoking of a permit was not subject
to an injunction on the ground that the board had not been legally
elected.
However, in Evers v. Hollman,18 decided in 1954, the Supreme Court
reversed a circuit court decision which, on certiorari, had vacated a
beer board's revocation of a permit on the ground of improper selection of the members of the board. In the Evers case before any proceedings were had before the beer board, the permit holder had moved
the dismissal of certain charges against her on the ground that the
board had not been created as provided in the statute. The particular defect alleged was that the board was appointed by the
14. See Anderson v. Memphis, 167 Tenn. 648, 72 S.W.2d 1059 (1934); Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d
233 (1953); see Lacey, supra note 1.

15. TENN. CODE ANm. § 8989 (Williams 1934). Cf. the statutory writ in lieu

of appeal. Id. § 8990.

16. TENN. CONST. Art. VI, § 10.
17. 263 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1953); see Sanders, Administrative Law-1954

Tennessee Survey, 7 VA-D. L. REv. 733, 740 (1954).

18. 268 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. 1954) (opinion by Tomlinson, J.).
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county judge instead of elected by the county court. This motion was
overruled by the board and after hearing the permit was ordered
revoked. The circuit court, upon hearing under the common-law
writ of certiorari, held that the board was not properly elected and
vacated its order of revocation. The Supreme Court's reversal of
this action declared that the members of the alleged defective board
"were not less than officers de facto." Crowe v. CarterCounty was cited
as standing for the proposition that the action of a beer board could
not be attacked on the ground that the board had not been legally
elected. Yet the procedure followed in the Evers case for review
was precisely that which the Crowe case said should have been utilized
to question an identical defect.
The results of the Crowe and Evers decisions taken together may be
restated as a rule of substantive law that beer permit holders have
no legal rights with respect to the method of selection of the beer
board. Apparently such persons would not have standing to challenge
board action for this reason by any type of proceedings where the rule
as to de facto officers was applicable. The rule seems on first impression to be an unduly restrictive limitation upon judicial review of
administrative agency action, since it can be demonstrated that a
question of legal authority to act is involved and the question is presented by one adversely affected by action of the agency. Still the result is probably not inconsistent with the general law on the subject
of officers de jure and de facto. 19 The decision illustrates the important
point that the body of law relating to officers de facto is not displaced
or superseded by our statutory or other provisions for judicial review
of administrative agency action, even though such review provisions
may be stated very broadly in scope.
Black v. Nashville20 might also be mentioned under method of judicial review. The Supreme Court here affirmed the chancery court's
sustaining of the city and beer board's plea in abatement to a suit for
an injunction. By her bill Mrs. Black the complainant, sought to enjoin
the city and the beer board from appealing from a decision of the circuit court which had restored a license revoked by the beer board. The
evidence before the beer board in the revocation proceedings had been
that the husband of the permit holder had been convicted of selling
whiskey. Subsequent to the beer board hearing, the circuit court had
heard an appeal from the conviction and had found that the husband
had not sold the whiskey. The theory of Mrs. Black's bill was that the
determination of the whiskey-selling charge by the circuit court subsequent to the taking of evidence on the revocation by the board was
final on that point; the chancery court should, therefore, enjoin any
attempt of the beer board to appeal from the order of the circuit court
19. See the same case in the article on Local Government, infra.

20. 276 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. 1955).
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which had set aside the action of the beer board in revoking Mrs.
Black's permit. The Supreme Court declared that the matter was to be
determined entirely by the record made before the beer board 2' and
not by the evidence or the result in the circuit court on the whiskeyselling charge. "The attack made... in this suit was in effect a collateral attack on the judgment of another court and it is well
settled ...

that this cannot be done, and that the proper method for

22
the correction of errors of a particular court is by appeal."
Timing: Questions of timing of proceedings for judicial review of
administrative action usually involve such preliminary conditions as
"ripeness" for review and exhaustion of administrative remedies. 23
Arendale v. Rasch24 is concerned with timeliness in the sense of seeking court review within the period set by statute (in this instance a
private act). Petition for certiorari was filed in the circuit court at
Memphis more than thirty days subsequent to action of the Shelby
County Board of Adjustment permitting variation in use in a zoning
case. Section 11, Chapter 613, Tennessee Private Acts of 1931, provides
for a thirty-day period subsequent to final action by the board within
which a petition for certiorari and supersedeas could be filed. The rules
of procedure of the Shelby County Board of Adjustment provide that
a petition to rehear must be filed not later than the next meeting after
the complained-of decision. In the Arendale case the petition to rehear
was filed late; the thirty-day period for seeking court review through
petition for certiorari began to run from the date of original adverse
action. The Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Prewitt affirmed
the granting of a motion to dismiss the petition, expressly resting its
decision on the failure to file within the time limit set in the private
act.
Scope of Review: Under this aspect of judicial review the problem
is the extent to which the reviewing court will substitute its judgment
for that of the administrative agency with respect to questions of fact
and of law involved in a particular proceeding. Tennessee has normally followed the "substantial evidence" rule on review of factual
determinations by the agency, i.e., the findings of fact by the agency,
if supported by substantial evidence in the record before the agency,
25
will not be overturned.
The Supreme Court had occasion to reiterate this principle in the
opinion on the petition to rehear in Evers v. Hollman.26 The language
suggests support for an even greater "hands-off" approach on the part
21. TENN.CODE Ax . § 1191-14 (Williams Supp. 1952).

22. 276 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tenn. 1955).
23. See DAvis, A.DMMSTRATivE LAW c. 15 (1951).
24. 268 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1954).
25. Tennessee Cartage Co. v. Pharr, 184 Tenn. 414, 199 S.W.2d 119 (1947);
see Sanders, supra note 17, at 741.
26. 268 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. 1954).
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of reviewing courts (the scintilla rule), although it is believed that no
such broader inference should be drawn.
"In such proceeding [certiorari to review a beer board's revocation of
permit] the Circuit Court is without authority to weigh the evidence. It
may review the evidence solely for the purpose, and to the extent, of
determining whether any of it that is material supports the action of the
Beer Board. If the record contains such supporting evidence the Circuit
Court may not disturb the Beer Board's action....
"... for this Court to have remanded this case in order that the
Circuit Court might weigh the evidence, as the petition to rehear insists,
will amount to nothing less than a remand of the case for a consideration ... of a question which the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction to consider."2 7
The above language may be contrasted with that of the Court of
Appeals for the Middle Section in Porter v. Tennessee Real Estate
Commission.28 Here the court affirmed the action of the circuit court
which had upheld the action of the real estate commission in revoking
appellant's license as a broker. Judge Howell's opinion makes no
mention of the function of the reviewing court with respect to the
evidence before the agency. It speaks of the support in the record for
"the finding of the trial judge" and concludes "that there is no error
' 29
in the action of the trial judge in suspending his license for one year.
In Black v. Nashville30 the most important problem related to the
record upon which the validity of the action of the administrative
agency would be reviewed. Apparently (although this is not entirely
clear) the circuit court overruled the beer board on the basis of facts
relating to the husband's conviction that were known or determined
by it independently of the record before the board. The Supreme
Court's opinion makes it clear that such a procedure, if it occurred,
would have been in error.31 It might be observed that, normally, the
best solution for one seeking the benefit of factual changes subsequent
to the administrative hearing would be to request the agency to reopen, or to request the reviewing court to remand to the agency for
the reopening of the record, for the reception of evidence relating to
the changed facts. The granting of such request would depend, of
course, on the legal relevance of the alleged change in circumstances
under the regulatory scheme administered by the particular board.
These cases make it clear that the substantial evidence rule (or
"material evidence" as many of the decisions express it) and the rules
precluding the reviewing court from determining facts independently
of the record made before the agency and from weighing the evidence
27. Id. at 101.
28. 271 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
29. Id. at 23.
30. 276 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. 1955).
31. Id. at 719.
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before the agency are all parts of a single basic principle of judicial
review when a nonjudicial type determination has been made. The
1953 decision of the Supreme Court in Hoover Motor Express Co. v.
Railroad & Public Utilities Commission72 is the outstanding recent
example of the application of this basic principle because it demonstrates the lengths to which the Court will go in avoiding a legislative
attempt to give reviewing courts a function contrary to the principle.
The important nub of the decision seems to be that reviewing courts
cannot constitutionally be given the job of independently determining
facts or of weighing the evidence before the agency when a "legisla33
tive" or "administrative" type determination is being reviewed. It
is unfortunate that the strained interpretation the Court felt obliged
to place on the statute relating to judicial review in the Hoover case
to avoid the foregoing constitutional objection tends to obscure rather
than elucidate the basic and generally accepted principle being utilized
in the decision.
During the current survey period there were important applications
of the Hoover precedent. In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Fowler4
the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court because it had improperly reviewed and set aside the action of the Railroad and Public
Utilities Commission in a case involving a petition to discontinue certain passenger trains. The pertinent code provision states:

"Upon application by the carrier, the commission shall authorize the
discontinuance of any passenger train when it shall be made to appear
that for a period of twelve months or more, the direct operating costs of
such train have exceeded the aggregate gross revenues therefrom by
more than thirty per cent."3 5
The commission, in its order denying the petition of the railroad,
defined the term "direct operating expense" as being "the necessary
cost of the train in making its operating trip to and from its respective
termini... the costs which were certain and inescapable as the result
of the operation of a particular train." Applying this definition the
commission held that engine-house expenses, maintenance of ways and
structures, and expenses of joint terminal facilities did not constitute
direct operating costs. The Chancery Court of Davidson County on
certiorari adopted the commission's definition but held that its action
in excluding maintenance of way and joint facility expenses from
direct operating costs was arbitrary and illegal.
The Supreme Court in reversing the chancellor relied heavily upon
the doctrine of the Hoover case and the assumption that, under it, the
32. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
33. See Sanders, Administrative Law-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7
Rzv. 733, 741-45 (1954).
34. 271 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tenn. 1954).
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 5398.1 (Williams Supp. 1952).

VAND. L.
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lower court undertook to exercise an administrative (as opposed to a
judicial) function in putting an opposite evaluation upon the evidence
before the commission. Further, the Supreme Court held that in
making its evaluation, the commission could rely upon factors within
its knowledge even though contrary to the only personal testimony
appearing in the record:
"The Railroad & Public Utilities Commission is not a Court, but is a
tribunal exercising such commingled legislative, executive and judicial
functions that it cannot be made a Court. The determination of whether
or not the Railroad Company shall be granted an order permitting it to
discontinue these trains, is an administrative function of Government. In
making such administrative determination, it is necessary that the
Commission hear evidence, but it is not restricted by the technical common law and statutory rules of evidence. Thus it is that, although the
witness Davis was not contradicted, the Commission had the right to
accept and rely on practices established by the railroads generally, or by
the particular administrative determination of the subject railroad involved in this case, or it had a right to accept one and reject the other.
The Commission having done the latter, that is, accepted one and rejected
the other, cannot be said to be without material evidence to support its
findings, and therefore, its action cannot be said to be arbitrary and void
or illegal."36
The Court concludes that Chapter 162 of the Public Acts of 1953
would be unconstitutional if construed to permit the chancellor to
put his own evaluation on the evidence with respect to what does and
does not constitute direct operating costs.
In the writer's opinion the foregoing application of the Hoover
precedent represents a significant extension rather than a precise
application of the doctrine announced in the earlier case. The determination being made in the Fowler case here is not the same in kind
as that relating to the grant of operating rights in the Hoover case.
The Court's opinion in Fowler by Justice Swepston says that the question of whether a railroad shall be permitted to discontinue a train
calls for administrative (i.e. non-judicial) determination. That is undoubtedly true in a general sense, but the precise issue here was the
interpretation and application of the words of a statute to undisputed
raw or evidentiary facts. Without getting into all the ramifications of
questions of law and of fact 37 it will be recognized that a question as
to how under the law to characterize certain facts (the meaning of the
statute as applied to these facts) is frequently treated as question of
law, or mixed question of law and fact-in either event a determination not at all foreign to the judicial function. 38
It is believed that the result in this case is to change the character
36. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Fowler, 271 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tenn. 1954).
37. See Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact,
57 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1944); DAvis, ADm iNSTRATivE LAW § 245 (1951).
38. DAvis, ADmiISTRATrVE LAW 874-78 (1951).
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of the Hoover doctrine of judicial noninterference by extending it into
the area of statutory interpretation and questions of law. Nevertheless
it should be noted that there is much support throughout the country
for doing under similar circumstances substantially what the Tennessee Supreme Court did here. Gray v. Powell,39 the 1941 decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, is treated as the leading case on
the doctrine that is used here although not invoked. In that case the
Court upheld a finding by the administrator of the Bituminous Coal
Act that the Seaboard Airline Railway was not a "producer" of coal
it consumed for purposes of exemption provided in the statute. "In a
matter left specifically by Congress to the determination of an administrative body ...the function of review placed upon the courts...
is fully performed when they determine that there has been a fair
hearing ... and an application of the statute in a just and reasoned
manner. '40 The Court went on to observe that lack of dispute as to the
evidentiary facts "does not permit a court to substitute its judgment
for that of the [administrator] .... Unless we can say that a set of
circumstances deemed by the Commission to bring them within the
concept 'producer' is so unrelated to the tasks entrusted .. .to the
Commission as in effect to deny a sensible exercise of judgment, it is
the Court's duty to leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed."41
A more recent authoritative statement of the principle of Gray v.
Powell is found in Unemployment Compensation Commission of
Alaska v. Aragon.4 The Aragon case is cited and quoted approvingly
(and with emphasis) by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Moore v.
Commissioner of Employment Security.43 In the Tennessee case a
claim for unemployment compensation had been denied by the Board
of Review and the other internal machinery of the Department of
Employment Security because the claimant was not "available for
work," an eligibility condition prescribed in the statute. It appeared
that the claimant had quit his work on the swing shift and was seeking
day work only because he considered shift work injurious to his
health (although he offered no medical or other evidence to this
effect). On petition for certiorari, the chancellor reversed the Board of
Review on the ground that there was no evidence in the record to sustain its finding. The Supreme Court reversed the chancellor and
quoted from a previous Tennessee decision using broadly significant
language from the Aragon case:
"The question presented 'is one of specific application of a broad statutory
term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must
39. 314 U.S. 402 (1941); see DAvs, ADMMISTRATIVE
ticularly pp. 882-87).
40. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941).
41. Id. at 412-13.
42. 329 U.S. 143 (1946).

43. 273 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn. 1954).

LAW

§ 246 (1951)

(par-

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 8

determine it initially.' To sustain the commission's application of this
statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable
one or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question
arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings. The 'reviewing court's
function is limited'. All that is needed to support the commission's interpretation in that it has 'warrant in the record' and a 'reasonable basis in
law.' Unemployment Compensation Commission of Territory of Alaska
v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 67 S. Ct. 245, 250, 91 L. Ed. 136, 145."44 (Emphasis
added by Tennessee Supreme Court.)
It will be noted that in the Moore case, as in the Fowler case, the
problem is that of the scope of judicial review when an agency construes and applies the words of a statute to undisputed evidentiary
facts. The very broad leeway given to the administrative agency in the
opinions should be tempered in application by the fact that there is
evidence in each case of a rather considerable review of the merits by
the Supreme Court and there is nothing to indicate that it disagreed
in fact or in law with what the agency had done. The more crucial
case for the use of the principle here announced would be a case where
the court disagreed with the agency and still refused to interfere. In
actual operation, there is always in the background the reviewing
court's undoubted power to set aside arbitrary, unreasonable and unwarranted findings whether factual, legal or mixed in their nature.
It is obvious that there is no mechanical solution to the problems of
scope of review. Decisions are and should be made not only on the
basis of an analysis of the technical nature of the question at issue but
on such practical considerations as the relative adequacy of the particular agency in terms of competence, thoroughness and procedural
fairness. 45 Basically, too, there is the matter of who can best determine
workable policies on the particular point 46-whose judgment does the
statutory framework and the nature of our political institutions place
in a presumptively preferred status so that it should be overturned
only under compelling circumstances.
Judicial review of the development of an administrative agency
program can undoubtedly err by failing to take responsibility for
policy judgments where within the court's province as well as by too
much intrusion into functions best performed by the agency. The
specialized nature of the agency may prevent adequate consideration
of public policy factors other than those in its statute. Gulf, Mobile
& Ohio R.R. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission47 is a possible
example of too much judicial relinquishment of responsibility. The
case, arising on certiorari to review the commission's order suspending
the railroad's reduced petroleum tariff rates, resulted in an affirmance
44. Milne Chair Co. v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 403, 230 S.W.2d 393, 396 (1950).
45. Compare DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §§ 248, 250, 251 (1951).
46. See id. § 248.

47. 271 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
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of the chancellor's dismissal of the carrier's petition. The decision relies
heavily on the Hoover decision and Tennessee Central Ry. v. Pharr48
in refusing to interfere with the commission's discretion after noting
that the statute provides that it shall exercise a careful and watchful
supervision over tariffs and increase or decrease them as justice to the
public and the carriers may require. 49 In this case, however, the railroad was seeking to compete for petroleum business it had lost to
motor carriers during World War II as a result of a defense transportation order prohibiting short hauls. The commission refused to permit
the railroads to reduce their tariff, an identical rate being set for rail
and motor carriers. The court's opinion seems to treat the whole subject as one that the court can do nothing about once it determines that
a general power to supervise and increase tariffs exists in the commission. There is virtually nothing in the reviewing court's opinion
which seeks to examine the conformity of the administrative action to
the statutory guides regarding justice to the public and the carriers
and the findings that were made in that respect. The consuming public
was being deprived of the probable benefit of cheaper petroleum
products by this agency action. The facts would suggest a more
thorough-going check of the agency action. Competition, which is
usually treated as of central importance in American business enterprise, was being prohibited here. Perhaps the railroad's reduced rates
which the commission ordered it to raise were both competitive and
remunerative to it. Perhaps efficiencies and cost-saving factors available to the railroads would justify the lower rate as compared with the
motor carrier rate.50 If so, justice to the consuming public and to the
rail carrier might well require that the lower rate be permitted. On
the other hand, of course, the rail carrier might have been setting the
lower rate at a loss for the purpose of eliminating motor carrier competition. In this latter case the justification for the commission's action
of disapproval would be apparent. We are not told which of these
two situations existed here.
From the standpoint of judicial review, the point is that there would
seem to be an obligation to require the agency (the commission) to
face up to and make findings sufficient to show reasonable compliance
with the guides given in the statute and with pertinent policies, judicially cognizable and applicable, embodied elsewhere in the laws of the
state. The opinion in this case at least gives no indication of what the
facts were surrounding the agency's order, or what findings were made
with regard to application of the several guides for agency action set
forth in Section 5425 of the Tennessee Code. The concept that
48. 29 Tenn. App. 531, 198 S.W.2d 289 (M.S. 1946).
49. TEN. CODE ANm. § 5425 (Williams 1934).
50. Compare ICC, CLASS AND ComMoDrms RATES, NEW YoRuK TO PHILADELPHIA, 51 M.C.C. 289 (1950).
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rate-setting is essentially nonjudicial in character and the consideration that in such matters the courts normally should not interfere cannot obscure the equally important fact that questions concerning
agency interpretation and application of a statute arise with respect to
which the reviewing court could properly exercise some judgment of
its own.
Res Judicata
"Courts normally apply law to past facts which remain staticwhere res judicata operates at its best-but agencies often work with
fluid facts and shifting policies." 5' This reasoning has led some courts
to assert that the doctrine is inapplicable to decisions of administrative
tribunals. 52 The overwhelming weight of authority, however, is
opposed to any such complete rejection. 3 During the survey period
the Tennessee Supreme Court relied upon the doctrine as the basis for
54
its decision in Polsky v. Atkins.
In this case the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court which on certiorari had overturned the order of the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation denying a renewal of a liquor license.
The record before the commissioner showed that Polsky had held a
retail liquor license for some six years in Chattanooga. Under the
statute 55 a license application is to be made annually and the applicant
must furnish a certificate of good moral character from designated city
officials. In 1952 Polsky had been refused such a certificate but the
city failed, after notice, to appear at a hearing on the matter before
the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation at which Polsky and an
assistant attorney general for the state did appear. At this 1952 hearing
Polsky testified as to the circumstances believed to be involved in the
refusal of the certificate. The commissioner issued a license for 1953
to Polsky after the hearing. On the occasion of Polsky's application
for a 1954 license he was again refused a certificate by city officials.
On the hearing before the commissioner on this occasion, however, the
officials appeared and evidence was introduced relating to sales to
minors by Polsky in November, 1952.
The commissioner denied the application but, on review, the circuit
court found this denial arbitrary because there was no evidence upon
which it could be based. The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by
Justice Burnett, stressing the fact that "fair play" and the provision
for review in the liquor licensing statutes "demand" the application of
51. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

563

(1951).

52. Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1947); but cf.
Cardinal Bus Lines v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 254 Ky. 586, 72 S.W.2d 7
(1934).
53. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 565-71 (1951).

54. 270 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1954).
55. TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 6648.10-14 (Williams Supp. 1952).

1955]
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953

the doctrine of res judicata under such circumstances.
A leading authority has said that to some administrative action the
principle of res judicata should be applied in all its rigor, while to
other such action it is wholly inappropriate. 6 Appropriateness then is
the key to the use of the idea and this factor requires consideration of
convenience and fairness for all concerned in the particular situation.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Polsky case seems to take
essentially this approach.
56. DAVIS,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

565 (1951).

